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Abstract
Administrative records in France, especially medical and social records, have huge potential for statistical studies. The
NIR (a national identifier) is widely used in medico-social administrations, and this would theoretically provide
considerable scope for data matching, on condition that the legislation on such matters was respected.
The law, however, forbids the processing of non-anonymized medical data, thus making it difficult to carry out studies
that require several sources of social and medical data.
We would like to benefit from computer techniques introduced since the 70 s to provide safe linkage of anonymized
files, to release the current constraints of such procedures.
We propose an organization and a data workflow, based on hashing and cyrptographic techniques, to strongly
compartmentalize identifying and not-identifying data.
The proposed method offers a strong control over who is in possession of which information, using different hashing
keys for each linkage. This allows to prevent unauthorized linkage of data, to protect anonymity, by preventing
cumulation of not-identifying data which can become identifying data when linked.
Our proposal would make it possible to conduct such studies more easily, more regularly and more precisely while
preserving a high enough level of anonymity.
The main obstacle to setting up such a system, in our opinion, is not technical, but rather organizational in that it is
based on the existence of a Key-Management Authority.
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Background
In the early 1970s, France had very promising statistical
potential thanks to the wealth of information in its admin-
istrative files, which could be exploited together or in the
context of a survey.
In 1974, computerization of the civil status register
under the unfortunate name of the SAFARI1 project gave
rise to considerable public outcry, with the fear that per-
sonal information concerning the whole population would
be recorded and could bemisused in the case of a totalitar-
ian government coming into power. Indeed, this national
identity numbermakes it possible to link information rela-
tive to the same person from many administrative files, as
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is currently done, with great precaution, by the statistics
institutes of all North-European countries.
This debate led to considerable reflection on the mea-
sures necessary to safeguard the privacy and freedoms of
individuals in the face of increasing computerization. It
gave rise to the law ‘Informatique et libertés’ voted on the
6th January 1978, which established CNIL2.
The impact of this law was globally very positive. How-
ever, it blocked the use of administrative statistics, either
by limiting statistics to the processing of a single file, or,
when crossing two or more files, by imposing procedures
that were disproportionately heavy and have in the past
proved to be strongly dissuasive (such as the requirement
for a decree from the Council of State).
In order to avoid the dangers of the general linkage of
administrative files, CNIL opted for a strategy that made
it impossible to use the same identifier in every file. As
the NIR3 was already widely used in social and healthcare
administrations, the CNIL restricted its use to the sectors
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of work, healthcare and social institutions. For the other
sectors (finance4, education, . . . ), new so-called “secto-
rial” identifiers were created, with no possibility of linking
the NIR to these new identifiers, even though such links
would have been useful for public statistics or research
purposes. Today, secure linkage techniques make it pos-
sible to overcome these restrictions. This is the subject of
this article.
The law forbids the manipulation of non-anonymized
personal medical data. However, it would be impossible
to link files containing personal medical data if these data
have been anonymized in the strictest sense, since there
is no information that would make it possible to link data
from two different files for one individual. Henceforth, we
will use the term anonymization to speak about relative
anonymization, which is notably based on pseudonymiza-
tion. Pseudonymization consists in systematically replac-
ing each value of an identifier field with another value,
with no possibility of returning to the initial value.
Our article, which is limited to pseudonymization of the
identifier, does not cover indirect identification, which is
all the more likely the more different files are linked. Of
course, this risk of identification depends on the informa-
tion, certainly unknown, held by the ill-intentioned third
party. We are thus talking about a “degree of anonymiza-
tion”, or “more-or-less partial anonymization”, which is not
really provided for in the law.
Since the 1970s, computer techniques have also evolved.
Current techniques now make it possible to safely
link data from different institutions while preserving
anonymity thanks to hashing (cf. section Hashing) of the
common identifier or, in the absence of such an identifier,
by probabilistic linkage (cf. section Probabilistic linkage).
In section A statistical information system, we expose
a strategy to safely overcome the constraints described
above, inspired from the one proposed by Quantin for
epidemiology [1], and we propose to apply this strategy





Hashing techniques [2] are computer procedures that
consist in calculating a fixed-size fingerprint (or signature)
from any data whatever the size.
A hash function allows any data to be mapped to an ele-
ment of a finished set, whose cardinal is very large5. This
means that there is no inverse operation that will allow the
initial data to be retrieved from the fingerprint, because
an infinite amount of data have the same fingerprint.
Moreover, the distance between two fingerprints of two
data is independent of the distance between these data.
A minimal difference between two data leads to two
very different fingerprints (so-called “avalanche effect”).
In contrast, two very different data may have similar or
identical fingerprints.
For example, hashing the chains “Dupont” and








A good hash function presents a low risk of collision,
which means that for different data of a similar size, the
probability of having the same fingerprint is extremely
low6. Collisions that could be introduced by hashing are
minor compared with problems of homonymity, which
can occur in practice when cleartext data such as sur-
names, first names and dates of birth are manipulated.
As the hash function has no inverse function, processing
by hashing is said to be irreversible. However, if the hash
function is known, it is possible to retrieve an original data
from its signature, thanks to so-called dictionary attacks.
Resisting attacks
The principle of these dictionary attacks is the following:
if one knows the hash function used, one can apply it to a
set of chains of characters. One can thus construct a table
of correspondence between each chain of characters and
its fingerprint from the hashing process.
The rate of collisions (i.e. two different chains giving
the same fingerprint) of hashing algorithms is extremely
low. Thus, to know a particular fingerprint, one sim-
ply has to look at the table of correspondence to iden-
tify with a high degree of certainty the initial chain of
characters.
This type of attack thus poses a problem of data con-
fidentiality if hashing is used to anonymize (or rather
pseudonymize) personal data. The solution therefore con-
sists in modifying the chain before applying the hash
function. A classical way of proceeding is to add a salt,
that is to say a secret key to each data before calculating its
fingerprint. If, for example, our key is “XZ!#45”, this key is







If neither the size nor the content of the key is known,
dictionary attacks become impossible in practice, because,
even if one assumes that the size of the key is between
1 and 20 bytes7, it is necessary to construct tables of
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correspondence, which poses a problem of computation
time and storage space.
Another way to proceed is to apply a function to the
chain. This can be a secret function (or a function using a
secret key) that can be used to either modify the chain to
be hashed, or to compute a different salt for each chain8.
There are several “standard” hashing functions [3]
(MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, . . . ), which are contin-
ually being studied for their resistance to attacks. The
ANSSI now recommends [4] using the SHA-256 method.
Utilization for data linkage
Hashing techniques applied to identifiers make it pos-
sible to pseudonymize files to be linked. However, this
pseudonymization does have drawbacks.
Indeed, if the slightest error is made in entering the
name, for example, the signature for the misspelled name
will be completely different from that obtained for the
correct name. Upstream normalization procedures may
limit such problems [5] (SOUNDEX, lower case only, sup-
pression of accents, . . . ). For the same reason, it is not
possible to calculate an edit distance (for example, Leven-
shtein distances, or Hamming distances, . . . [6]) to use in
deterministic linkage9 (cf. section Deterministic linkage).
Hashing is already used to link data from several files in
order to safeguard relative anonymity [7].
It is also worth mentioning the use of double hashing
when files to be linked come, for example, from several
establishments. It is necessary to hash the identifier fields
in the same way (with the same secret key) in all of the
files to allow linkage according to these fields. However,
the establishment that receives these files carries out a sec-
ond hashing (with a second secret key) so as to render the
aggregated data anonymous vis-a-vis the establishments
that produced the files [8].
Finally, given the irreversible nature of hashing, it is
important to keep the unhashed data, as they may be
exploitable only with data that underwent the same hash-
ing process. This implies that the keys used must be man-
aged carefully, with, for example, one key per study, or it
may be necessary to set up a Key-Management Authority
(cf. section Discussion).
Deterministic and probabilistic linkage
There are two types of linkage, depending on the data to
be linked. See [9] for a review of linkagemethods and their
use for healthcare data.
Deterministic linkage
So-called deterministic linkage consists in determining
the identifier fields in the two sources of data to be linked,
and then defining a distance and a threshold based on
which two records are deemed to belong to the same indi-
vidual. The term “deterministic” stems from the fact that
the thresholds chosen do not depend on the data to be
linked, that is to say that the same thresholds are used even
if supplementary data are added to the files to be linked.
The classical application of this method consists in
deciding to match records for which the identifiers are
strictly identical. Thus, by linking data according to the
NIR, or a double-hashed NIR, it is easy to carry out
this “strict” matching method10 and it is as reliable the
identifier field used.
In this family of linkage methods, several refinements
are possible. One can thus concatenate all of the identifier
fields, apply a distance to this concatenation and compare
the results with a threshold. One can also apply a different
distance to each field so as to obtain a global distance by
weighting.
Finally, the distance can also be defined for each field
and with a binary result (0 or 1). One can thus define rules
that associate amatching decision with each configuration
of similitudes and differences between two records.
Probabilistic linkage
Probabilistic linkage is useful when there is no unambigu-
ous identifier field (such as the NIR) for the individuals
concerned that is common to the two sources of data to be
linked, and for which it is impossible to establish rules (for
examples, from distances between fields), as is the case
when the information has been anonymized by hashing
(cf. section Utilization for data linkage).
The probabilistic nature of these methods stems from
the fact that they use weights associated with each field
used as identifier, and called unit weights. These unit
weights depend on the different values present in the fields
used as identifiers, their frequency, etc. These unit weights
are then summed to obtain a compound weight.
Two thresholds for these compound weights make it
possible to classify the pairs of records as “Matched”,
“Unmatched” or “Indecision”. These thresholds are chosen
in an ad hocmanner, depending on the study and the asso-
ciated constraints : necessary accuracy, nature and quality
of data, tolerance of error due to missing or excess data,
possibility to verify and validate, . . .
Unlike deterministic linkage methods, if data is added
to the files to be linked, it will modify the weights used
in the linkage decision, and thus the choice of thresholds.
The theoretical framework for these probabilistic linkage
methods was established in [10] in 1968. In 1995, for the
first time Jaro applied these methods to healthcare data
in [11] using a computer program. In 1998, [12] described
the first application of the Jaro method to files that had
been anonymized by hashing.
Principles
We seek to link two files, constituted of records, each
record being composed of several fields.
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The aim is to bring together data for the same patient
while minimizing errors :
• Duplicates (false negatives) : not associating two
records which concern the same individual. This
happens when the information (the fields of records)
used to match the records is not precise enough or
contains errors (name changes, input errors, ...);
• Collisions (false positives) : incorrectly associating
information from 2 different people.
Table 1 illustrates these different cases.
The idea of the method is to take into account the infor-
mation brought by each value of each field chosen as an
identifier (family name, first name, date of birth, . . . ), and
its frequency. Thus, the sex will be far less discriminative
than the date of birth, because there are in most cases only
two possibles values. In the same way, in a file exclusively
containing recently new-borns, the year of birth brings
little information.
For this reason, a unit weight is attributed to each iden-
tity characteristic. The value will be positive in cases when
two records correspond and will be negative in cases when
two records do not correspond.
The Fellegi and Sunter model proposed to distribute
pairs into two sets M (for “matched”, the pairs that corre-
spond to the same individual) and U (for “unmatched”).
For each identifier field i, two probabilitiesmi and ui are
calculated. mi is the probability that the two records have
the same value in the field i when the pair belong toM. ui
is the probability that the two records have the same value
in the field i when the pair belong to U.
Once these two probabilities are known, the unit weight
associated with a field will be log miui (positive value) when
the values in field i correspond, otherwise the weight will
be log 1−mi1−ui (negative value).
As the pairs that correspond to the same individ-
ual are unknown, since this is the aim of the linkage
method, these unit weights are estimated thanks to the
EM (Expectation-Maximization) algorithm introduced by
Winkler [13] or one of its subsequent variants [9, 14].
These algorithms proceed by iteration, by using data to be
linked to converge estimators ofmi and ui.
Once the unit weights have been obtained, they can be
summed (they are log likelihood ratios) to obtain a com-
pound weight. The method gives the probabilities that
pairs corresponding to each compound weight belong to
Table 1 Duplicates and collisions
Same individual Different individuals
Same name True positive False positive = collision
Different names False negative = duplicates True negative
M and U. Figure 1 illustrates these probabilities according
to compound weight.
We thus obtain an “unmatched” zone, for which the
probability of belonging toM is low, while the probability
of belonging to U is high. In another zone “matched”, the
probability of belonging toM is high while that of belong-
ing to U is low. Finally, in the third zone “indecision” it is
impossible to decide automatically whether or not the two
records concerned can be linked. We therefore have two
thresholds.
Depending on the purpose of the linkage, more or less
high thresholds can be used to classify each pair of files in
these three categories.
Example
Let us illustrate this method with a linkage done on hos-
pitalization data of a healthcare establishment (linkage
of two successive years), based on three identifier fields:
the family name, the first name and the date of birth.
Henceforth, the two files to be linked will be called A
and B.
For each field, the unit weight is the same as the log
likelihood from Table 1; it is thus additive for all of the
individual’s identifier characteristics. Calculation of unit
weights, depending on data, gives the results shown in
Table 2.
For each pair of records (one from file A and one from
file B), the compound weight is computed by summing
the unit weight associated with each field depending on
whether it is the same or different for this field in the
two records. Table 3 shows the compound weight of sev-
eral configurations of equality and differences among the
8 possible configurations (2 × 2 × 2) for our 3 fields.
Table 4 shows the result of a comparison between two
records.
Fig. 1 Linkage decision according to compound weight
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Table 2 Results of the unit weight calculation for each of the 3
fields used for linkage
Family Name First name Date of birth
Weight is equal (1) 8.4 5.7 10.3
Weight is different (0) -2.8 -3.5 -3.1
For each pair, the linkage decision is based on the
compound weight thresholds chosen depending on the
required accuracy of the study (cf. Table 5).
For the pairs for which there is no automatic decision
for linkage, that is to say for the configurations in which
the compound weight is between thresholds 1 and 2 (cf.
Fig. 1)11, manual validation is possible, by returning to the
patient’s hospital record12. This validation, which allows
the linkage or not of “indecision” records, can partly be
done automatically by supplementary procedures applied
to part of the record pairs, namely those below the auto-
matic linkage threshold, for which a good proportion (for
example, as in Table 5, a large part of the 725 pairs agree-
ing on the family name and the date of birth should be
linked; the first name could be different just because of
a typing problem). This automated validation can also
use other discriminating fields which were not used for
automatic classification.
This probabilistic linkage method was notably used
to determine vital status by linking hospital data with
national mortality data in [15].
In accordance with the legislation, the data had been
anonymized beforehand by using the hashing technique.
In practice, the comparisons of fields are thus done on
hashed data. Thus, Table 4 is more likely to resemble
Table 6.
Linkage by blocks
The application of probabilistic methods to even
moderate-sized files requires nonetheless a substan-
tial amount of computation time, due to the cartesian
product between the records.
To overcome this problem, the so-called “blocking”
method [11, 16] is used. This method makes it possible
to match only certain records of file A and file B. If, for
example, the sex field is reliable, we can decide to link only
data that match for this field. The same can be done using
Table 3 Computation of the compound weight according to the







Without disagreement (111) +8.4 +5.7 +10.3 +24.4
Dis. on the family name (011) -2.8 +5.7 +10.3 +13.2
Disagreement on the DoB (110) +8.4 +5.7 -3.1 +11
Disagreement in all fields (000) -2.8 -3.5 -3.1 -9.4
Table 4 Example of a computation of compound weights for
two records
Family name First name Date of birth
Dupont François 29/01/1940
Dupont François 29/03/1940
Weight +8.4 +5.7 -3.1 = 11
the year of birth, for example. Blocking can also be done
for several fields at the same time (for example, sex and
year of birth). Finally, blocks from several fields can be
matched successively to find more matches: if the sex field
is not reliable, additional matches can be found by using
blocking according to the year of birth, or vice-versa.
Encryption
Principles
Encryption techniques [17] (encrypting) consist in mak-
ing a message unreadable for those who do not have the
key to make it readable again. It is a very dynamic field of
research, because these techniques lie at the heart of com-
munication security on the Internet, bank transactions,
etc.
There are two families of encryption techniques : those
that use the same key for encrypting and decrypting (so-
called symmetric methods) and those that use two keys,
a public key and a private key (so-called asymmetric
methods or “public-key” methods).
Symmetric methods
In methods that use a single key, the originator and the
authorized recipient of the encrypted message must have
the same key, which is kept secret. Any person in pos-
session of the key and the encrypted message is able to






DoB Frequency Thresholds Weight P(m) G(u)
0 0 0 1 452 966 248 -9.4 6e-08 99.99
0 1 0 4 880 218 -0.2 5e-04 99.99
1 0 0 304 887 1.8 4e-03 99.99
0 0 1 46 081 1.4 0.04 99.96
1 1 0 1 438 “unmatched”
threshold
11 28.79 71.21
0 1 1 725 13.2 78.66 21.34
1 0 1 291 “matched”
threshold
15.2 96.68 3.32
1 1 1 8 852 24.4 99.99 4e-04
P(m) : Probability that the 2 records of the pair correspond to the same individual
G(u) : Probability that the 2 records correspond to 2 different individuals
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Table 6 Example of calculation of compound weights for two anonymized records
Family name First name Date of birth
fe1fb20e56bd... 5b7808252fec... aeed71d1dc67...
fe1fb20e56bd... 5b7808252fec... 9b1549d98eab...
Weight +8.4 +5.7 -3.1 = 11
decrypt the message and thus to get the information it
contains.
These methods have several drawbacks. The originator
and the authorized recipient must use a secure channel to
share the key. In addition, each pair or group of individ-
uals who share secret messages must have the same key
reserved for communication with this group of individuals
exclusively.
For example, if Alice, Bob and Charlie want to share
messages two by two, each of them will need two keys. For
each new person they wish to communicate with, each of
them will need an additional key, and this without taking
into account possible combinations of different composi-
tions of groups of people who may wish to communicate
with each other. It quickly becomes difficult to manage all
of the keys.
Asymmetric methods
Asymmetric encryption methods overcome this problem.
These techniques are based on pairs of keys, a public one
and a private one. Each person has such a pair of keys.
The private key, as its name suggests, is not shared and
remains in possession of its owner. The public key, in con-
trast, can be associated with the owner in the context of
an authentification directory, in such a way to ensure that
this key is indeed the public key corresponding to the pri-
vate key of the owner. However, each person can have as
many pairs of keys as they wish and share the public part
as they see fit.
When a message is encrypted with the private key, only
the public key allows it to be decrypted. This means that
a message can be signed electronically to authenticate its
author13. However, it is also possible to encrypt a message
with the public key. In this case, only the holder of the
corresponding private key can decrypt themessage, which
ensures the confidentiality of exchanges.
Henceforth, we will use the following notations:
• pubX designates the public key of X or the public
part of key X,
• privX designates the private key of X or the private
part of key X,
• Ck(I) designates the encryption of information I
using key k ; if k is a private key, the information will
be encrypted for authentication; if k is a public key,
the information will be encrypted for confidentiality;
• C−1k (I) designates the decryption of the encrypted
information I using the key k.








) → I (authentication).
It is possible to combine authentication and confiden-
tiality. If Alice wants to send secret information to Bob,
while allowing Bob to make sure that this information
comes from Alice, Alice will use her private key to sign the
message and Bob’s public key to encrypt everything. At
reception, Bob will use his private key to decrypt the mes-
sage and Alice’s public key to make sure that the message
is well and truly from her.
Another combination is also possible. For example, if
one wants information I to become accessible only when
two people A and B agree, it suffices to encrypt this infor-
mation successively with two public keys. Access to the
initial information thus requires the use, in inverse order,
of two private keys (one held by A, and the other held by











Other combinations are possible, but in the following,
we are above all interested in the confidentiality ensured
by this encryption system.
Utilization for data linkage
These cryptographic methods make it possible to secure
exchanges of data, by ensuring both their confidentiality
and their origin.
They cannot be used for data anonymization because,
unlike hashing, encryption is reversible. However, com-
bined with hashing, they can be used to entrust data
linkage to a trusted third party, while separating access
to personal data. This use is presented in the following
section.
A statistical information system
The situation is thus as follows : administrations have a
wealth ofmedical, educational and social information, and
some of this information uses the NIR as the identifier.
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Use of the NIR to link different files requires a decree
issued by the Council of State. However, the use of
hashing techniques on identifier fields allows the relative
anonymization of data. Files with a NIR that have been
anonymized using these hashing techniques can be linked
without the need for a decree from the Council of State
[18, 19].
However, it is not enough to pseudonymize identi-
fier fields (like the NIR) to guarantee a certain level of
anonymity. Indeed, while even pseudonymous data can
still sometimes be re-identified notably via trajectory
information, this risk is even greater when other informa-
tion is added by linkage. More can be read on this subject
in [20].
A trusted third party is thus needed to carry out the link-
age and the required statistical studies. This party must
have acces to the minimum amount of data necessary for
the linkage and the study in question, a study that will
moreover require the authorization of CNIL.
In [1], an organization meeting this requirement is pro-
posed for epidemiology. We propose a new organization
for public statistics.
Principle
Two constraints have to be satisfied. One is the sharing
of common identifiers to allow linkage. The other is the
constraint of guaranteeing the anonymity of data.
In this section, we will take the example of the NIR as
the identifier used for the linkage. The following section
will discuss the generalization of this technique to other
identifiers.
By applying double hashing to the NIR, it can be used to
link files after authorization from CNIL [18]. The hashing
keys used to hash theNIR in the two files to be linkedmust
of course be the same. This implies that if an entity is in
possession of two files with NIR hashed in the same way,
the risk of re-identification is increased.
The idea is to use encryption and hashing of the NIR
on the one hand, and trusted third parties on the other,
so as to precisely control who has access to what infor-
mation and who can link this information. To do so,
identifying information has to be separated from data, as
recommended in [21].
Figure 2 illustrates our proposal, with two producers of
data and an organization that wishes to link the data. The
numbers in yellow circles are the numbers of the steps
listed below.
All of the channels of communication are supposedly
secure. The linkage procedure would be as follows:
1. For each study, the key management authority sends
2 hashing keys : one (HK1) to the producers of the
data, the other (HK2) to a trusted third party who
will link the identifying data. Another solution could
be to provide a “hashing service” to which the data to
be hashed could be sent (eventually sent in a random
order to diminish the risk of re-identification), but it
is preferable to send as little information as possible,
all the more so since the sender of information is
already information : for example if an anti-cancer
centre sends an NIR, it can be deduced that the
corresponding person has cancer.
2. This trusted third party generates an asymmetric
encryption key for the study and sends the public
part (PubE) to each producer. The key management
authority is not to know this key, whose sole purpose
is to ensure the secure transfer of information
between the producers and organization which will
link the hashed identifying data.
3. Each producer of information numbers each record
sequentially (or with a unique random number for
the study), so as to have an identifier that contains no
information, a so-called “neutral” identifier. Each
identifier field (here the NIR) is then hashed with
HK1 provided by the key management authority.
H(NIR) is thus obtained. A random chain, which is
different for each record and has a given length, is
then added to the H(NIR) and the whole sequence is
then encrypted using PubE , to obtain
CPubE (H(NIR), random).
4. Each producer sends the correspondences between
CPubE (H(NIR), random) and the sequential number,
for each record, to the trusted third party. Even if a
producer is able to obtain a file of another producer,
the encryption prevents the person from linking
records because of the different random part for each
record, which, for the same H(NIR) will lead to two
different results following encryption with PubE .
5. The trusted third party receives the two files. For
each record of each file, he uses PrivE (the private
part of the encryption key) to decrypt the H(NIR)
followed by the random chain. The random chain is
then removed to retain only the H(NIR). He then
applies a second hashing with the second hashing key
HK2 provided by the key management authority.
DH(NIR) is thus obtained.
6. At this stage, the trusted third party therefore has, for
each producer, a file with a correspondence between
a sequential number and a DH(NIR). By comparing
DH(NIR)s, the trusted third party can generate a
table of correspondences between the sequential
numbers of each producer of data. He sends this
table to the organization authorized to link the data.
7. In addition, each producer of data sends to this
organization a file containing records composed of
the sequential number and the data to be linked.
8. When this organization receives these two files and
the table of correspondences, it can link the data
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Fig. 2 Proposed organization for secure matching
from each producer by using the sequential number
of each and the table of correspondences provided.
A variation of the previous method may be needed if
no Key Management Authority is available for the pro-
cedure or if one datasource contains only the NIR as the
identifier and the other one only has information such
as name, surname, dant and place of birth but not the
NIR. In such cases, the trusted third party has to play
a more central role and needs to get more identifying
information than in the previous method to perform the
hash function. Everything has to be done under the strict
supervision of the data-protection authority (CNIL in
France).
Results
The proposed organization and workflow, while still
allowing linkage between different data sources, provide
strong compartmentalization of identiyfing data and other
data.
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Indeed, only the producers have the directly identify-
ing information. The trusted third party only has the
hashed version of this information and no other data apart
from the temporary sequential number used for this study.
Moreover, the trusted third party does not have the first
hashing key, thus making it impossible to carry out a
dictionary attack on the hashed data.
The organization wishing to link the data has no identi-
fying information. The key management authority has no
identifying or non-identifying data. It does, however, have
the two hashing keys. If this authority was able to obtain
the files containing the doubly hashed NIR (DH(NIR)),
a dictionary attack to obtain the original NIR would be
possible. It would therefore be more secure to have two
different authorities each of which will generate a hashing
key for the study.
Cumulation of non-identifying data can lead to a lower
level of anonimity, since the more non-identifying data is
gathered, the higher is the risk of re-identification (see [22]
for a well-known example). The proposed method offers
a strong control over who is in possession of which infor-
mation, using different hashing keys for each linkage. This
allows to prevent unauthorized linkage of data, to protect
anonymity.
Besides, the method presented in the previous section
can be generalized to any identifying information instead
of the NIR. If the files to be linked do not contain any com-
mon identifier information that is specific to an individual,
linkage can still be achieved on several fields such as the
family name, the first name, the date and place of birth;
in such cases, double-hashing and double-encryption are
applied to each of these fields. The third party carrying
out the linkage may then, after decryption of each field,
apply a probabilistic linkage method (cf. section Proba-
bilistic linkage), which, as we have seen, is still effective on
anonymized data [12].
Unfortunately, it was not possible for us to apply the
method we described in this article. Indeed, the data
protection authority (CNIL) and the current legal frame-
work do not allow public bodies to use the NIR (national
unique identifier) to match datafiles, even for scientific
purposes, without issuing a decree signed by the prime
minister. This makes it almost impossible for researchers.
The current legal framework allows private organizations
to match datafiles by the NIR for scientific purposes. This
is very rare and authorization from CNIL is required.
We had the opportunity to use a variation of the method
described in this article for the ESPS survey (Health,
health care and insurance survey) led by Irdes (Insti-
tute for Research and Information in Health Economics,
private status). The aim of ESPS was to merge survey
microdata, provided by a private company that carries out
the survey, with administrative microdata from CNAM-
TS (National Health Service in France). 8000 households
(22000 persons) were interviewed to know, for example,
how they perceived their health status or the reasons for
not seeking care or their opinions about health.
The data matching process allowed to add the real con-
sumption of medical services. As a trusted third party,
CASD (French research data centre) received the list of
identifiers of the sample : NIR, name, surname, address
and generated asymmetric encryption keys for the study
and a “neutral” identifier called BenN . CASD sent BenN ,
name, surname and address, encrypted using the GnuPG
software, to the private company to perform the survey.
CASD also hashed the NIR with a secret key known only
by CNAM-TS and sent the resulting list to CNAM-TS
which enriched the data with information on reimburse-
ments for healthcare. CNAM-TS then sent the file with
the enriched information and the above-mentioned “neu-
tral” identifier BenN to Irdes, while the private company
sent to Irdes the survey datafile with only BenN as the
identifier, so that Irdes could match both files without get-
ting any identifier. It was possible to add administrative
microdata to the surveymicrodata to compare the feelings
about health status with the real consumption of health
services.
Discussion
The organization that finalizes the linking of data may
find itself in three situations, with two of them being
non-exclusive:
• each record of producer 1 corresponds to a record of
producer 2 and reciprocally; in this case linkage is
total,
• there is no correspondence between some records of
one producer and those of the other producer,
• there are several correspondences between some
records of a one producer and those of the other
producer.
The way in which the latter two situations are treated
depends on the study being conducted. Incomplete link-
age could be due to an error or could be perfectly normal.
In the same way, multiple linkages can be treated differ-
ently depending on the objectives of the study.
To avoid the transmission of useless data, rather than
each producer sending all of the data, including data that
cannot be linked, the organization doing the linkage could
request producers to send only data corresponding to the
neutral identifiers appearing to be linked in the table of
correspondences.
In addition, in Fig. 2, the organization using the linked
data is the one that carries out the linking. It is possi-
ble to include another party for the final step, and thus
send the linked data to the organization authorized to
use them.
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Concerning the key used for the first hashing (HK1), a
possible solution would be for one of the producers to
generate the key themselves and to send it to the sec-
ond producer. For the second hashing key (HK2), the
party linking the neutral identifier could generate the
key. For studies carried out over long periods, however,
or to ensure the reproducibility of studies (and research
reproducibility in general), it would be better to con-
serve these keys. Indeed, in order to carry out linkage
using hashed identifiers, all of the identifiers must be
hashed in the same way with the same keys. For long-term
studies, or studies which make use of data from previ-
ous studies, it is therefore necessary to conserve the keys
used. For us, the existence of a key management author-
ity therefore seems necessary. The issue of archiving and
the use of linkage to include data from previous studies
while ensuring the relative anonymity of participants is a
topic of research that needs to be investigated in greater
depth.
Finally, the authenticity of the keys used must be estab-
lished : when an institution communicates encrypted data
to another one using a public key, it must make sure
that this key is well and truly the one to use to trans-
mit data to the recipient institution and for the study in
question.
If the Key-Management Authority provides the keys, it
will sign them to authenticate them and encrypt them so
as to ensure their confidentiality and their integrity when
they are transmitted to the recipient establishments.
The data handling chain is thus made secure by encryp-
tion while the anonymity of data is ensured as the data
identifiers are doubly hashed before transmission to the
third party carrying out the linkage.
This research helped us in our discussions with the
authorities to define a new legal framework for data
matching in France. A new act, the digital act, has just
been voted and will take effect before the end of 2016.
A dedicated article in this law will allow public organi-
zations to match data for scientific purposes using the
NIR according to a specific process based on the method
presented in this article. The law stipulates that a Key
Management Authority and a trusted third party must be
involved in the process as described in this article. It also
stipulates that the NIR must be encrypted (“cryptographic
operations” have to be performed). Instead of issuing a
decree as before, only a regular authorization of CNIL
will be required. This major change will foster research in
many disciplines by allowing the linkage of datasources for
scientific purposes.
Conclusions
As we have seen, current computer techniques (hashing
and encryption) make it possible to carry out statistical
studies requiring the linkage of social and medical files
while preserving a high enough level of anonymity tomeet
CNIL requirements.
The proposal presented above, using these techniques,
would make it possible to conduct such studies more eas-
ily, more regularly and more precisely while preserving a
high enough level of anonymity.
For us, it seems important to implement such a proce-
dure, with a Key-Management Authority and the needed
trusted third parties like the ones proposed here to
unblock research and studies that use social and medi-
cal data. The main obstacle to setting up such a system,
in our opinion, is not technical, but rather organiza-
tional in that it depends on and is made possible by the
existence of a Key-Management Authority, whose role is
to generate, transmit and keep the keys for each study,




2Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés
3NIR stands for “Numéro d’inscription au répertoire” ; it
is a national identifier.
4 This situation has evolved. For example, the fiscal
administration now associates the NIR with its sectorial
identifier, to remove duplicates and to transmit useful fis-
cal information to social organizations, for example, when
a welfare payment is subject to an upper limit of income.
5For example, the number of different signatures pro-
duced by SHA-256 is 2256, a number greater than 1077.
6For example, for words of 80 bits (10 characters each
coded using one octet), the risk of collision using SHA256
is of the order of 10−31.
71 byte = 8 bits = 256 possibilities.
8This is the method used in ANONYMAT software,
developed at Dijon CHU and validated by CNIL for the
anonymization of data for linkage purposes [8].
9It is nonetheless possible, before hashing, to break
up information, for example, into blocks of n separately
hashed characters, and then apply a distance calculation
to these hashed blocks; the distance could be a function of
the number of identical hashed blocks, or a more complex
measurement using for example Bloom filters as in [23].
10For files stored in an SQL-type database, a simple join
query is enough to link the files.
11Rather than manual validation, the descriptive infor-
mation provided can also be used. Thus, in our example,
the model tells us that among the 725 cases with 011,
78.66 % “should” be matched.
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12Manual validation also depends on the type of study
and on the importance of the data concerned. For exam-
ple, in an epidemiological study concerning the impact
of a drug, we need to be as accurate as possible, and
manual validation would allow us to correctly match the
maximum number of records. For a less critical study, for
example linking success at the baccalaureat with marks
obtained during the year, a lower matching rate would be
acceptable, without the need to manually verify the data
at considerable expense.
13Authentification can take place as follows : When Bob
wants to send a message to Alice while allowing Alice
to be sure that he sent the message, he applies a hash
function to his message to obtain a fingerprint. Then he
encrypts this fingerprint with his private key. When Alice
receives the message, she can in turn apply the same
hash function to themessage, then decrypt the fingerprint
using Bob’s public key, and finally compare the two fin-
gerprints. If they are identical, Bob was indeed the author
of the message, because only the owner of the private key
(Bob) could have encrypted it in such a way that the pub-
lic key (Bob’s) could decrypt it. The author of a message
can thus be authenticated.
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